LIBERTARIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL COERCION: THE PROBLEM OF THE “MINIMAL STATE”

Abstract

The article provides a philosophical and legal analysis of the concept of libertarianism through the prism of the problem of legal coercion and the idea of the “minimal state”. It reveals the value foundation of libertarian doctrine, which is centered on the principles of individual freedom, personal autonomy, inviolability of private property, and negative rights. The main intellectual origins of libertarianism, its connection with classical liberalism, and its evolution in the works of leading thinkers are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the principle of non-interference and the presumption of liberty, according to which coercion may only be applied in response to the violation of the rights of others. It is established that libertarianism forms a clear criterion for the legitimacy of state coercion, which is based on the necessity to protect natural human rights. The thesis is substantiated that libertarianism offers a radically limited understanding of legitimate legal coercion, reducing it to the functions of protection against violence, fraud, and violation of the rights of others. Special attention is order, as well as to the critique of its practical feasibility in the context of modern complex social systems. The article examines the relationship between freedom and coercion in law, the limits of permissible state intervention in the sphere of individual autonomy, as well as the risks of social disintegration that arise in the case of excessive reduction of state functions. At the same time, the work highlights critical aspects of the concept of the minimal state, in particular doubts regarding its practical implementation and its ability to ensure social justice and protect vulnerable groups. A comparison with the model of the modern rule-of-law state shows that the latter combines the limitation of power with the performance of social functions, which creates a certain tension between the ideals of freedom and the needs of society. It is concluded that libertarianism, despite its theoretical nature, holds significant importance as a tool for criticizing excessive state intervention and for shaping approaches to defining the limits of legal coercion. Its ideas can be used to improve modern legal systems by ensuring a balance between individual freedom and the necessity of maintaining public order. This demonstrates the ambivalent nature of the libertarian concept of the minimal state, which, on the one hand, performs an important critical function regarding excessive state paternalism, and on the other hand, requires correction taking into account the axiological requirements of social justice and human security.